BACKGROUND: These elections constitute the last phase in a three-phase \”political process\” designed by the Kremlin to normalize conditions in Chechnya through its loyalist Chechen government. The first phase consisted of holding a constitutional referendum in March 2003, followed by presidential elections held in November 2004 that resulted, as was clear, with the success of the pro-Russian administration, headed by former mufti Ahmad Kadyrov, who was killed only seven months later. The elections were pursued nevertheless and placed Alu Alkhanov at the head of the government. The third phase was that of parliamentary elections with participation of political parties. This \”political process\” adopted by Moscow in Chechnya met with great opposition from human rights and humanitarian organizations, analysts, journalists and regional organizations – in spite of the participation of some regional organizations that entertain good relations with Moscow as monitors of the electoral process. The bodies that had reservations over the \”political process\” justified their boycott of the elections with the presence of military forces among civilians: the news agency Interfax indicated on September 27 that 16,000 Russian soldiers were to participate in the elections. Other reasons cited included the lack of honesty and transparency, and the fact that voting took place in dreadful humanitarian conditions for the Chechen people. This was most authoritatively indicated by a report published by a group of humanitarian organizations explaining the conditions surrounding the \”political process\”, entitled \”In a Climate of Fear\”. Generally speaking and in addition to the reservations of those humanitarian organizations, the party that won the elections, United Russia, is led by the son of the former pro-Russian president, Ramzan Kadyrov, who is in fact ruling over Chechnya with his militias that exceed 5,000 fighters. He is also involved in human rights violations and cases of corruption, all in collaboration with the Russian forces. That is why many consider that these elections are only paving the way for Kadyrov Jr. to assume authority, which will in turn will diminish that of the present pro-Russian president Alu Alkhanov.
IMPLICATIONS: While the \”new\” Chechen constitution, that was written in Moscow, stipulates that the president to be over thirty years old, Kadyrov Jr. will be ready for this position on October 5. As a result, observers believe that those last elections came to prepare him to head the pro-Moscow administration in Chechnya. Reports indicate that Kadyrov Jr. is trying also to legitimize his control over the oil industry and assets and the Republic\’s economic institutions through the new parliament. Kadyrov Jr.\’s ambition is set to create a rivalry and conflict of interests between him and Alu Alkhanov, who on the morning of the elections announced that he was on his way to Brussels to negotiate with Chechen fighters, in spite of having always been opposed to holding any dialogue with them. During his visit to Jordan, which was part of a tour that included Syria as well, Alkhanov had previously alluded to criticisms of Kadyrov Jr. in an attempt to gain the support of Chechens living abroad, especially in Jordan. This is a telltale sign of a possible collision between pro-Russian parties, particularly as some reports indicate tension between Kadyrov Jr. and pro-Russian field commander Sulim Yamadayev. A possible outcome is a conflict over economic and political power, that could turn out to be bloody, between all those parties. Two elements in the political equation in Chechnya have not yet been analyzed, and are more important than the pro-Russian administration: the Chechen resistance and the Chechen people. Speaking on behalf of the Chechen resistance, the President of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Abdul-Halim Sadulayev announced that the elections were a \”charade\” and that the Chechen people were frustrated with the political process run by Moscow. Results from opinion polls held before the elections indicated that 68 percent thought that the elections would not be honestly held and only 8 percent said they would be. In addition, 72 percent thought that Kadyrov was the one benefiting from the elections and that they were held to serve his interest.
CONCLUSIONS: If we add to these frustrations the taxes imposed on people by way of supporting the political process or building a statue for Kadyrov Sr., and the poor humanitarian conditions resulting from the violations committed by Russian forces and their local subordinates, the prospects look bleak: one the one hand, we can expect on the one hand that increasing numbers of common Chechens will join the resistance, and on the other that the extremism and radicalization of the resistance will increase. Indeed, Sadulayev has moved closer to the hard-line Chechen resistance that seeks to alleviate the pressure it faces inside Chechnya with operations in neighboring territories. This helps explain the statement by pro-Russian Chechen Interior Minister the week after the elections to the effect that the situation in Chechnya has escalated after the elections and \”offenses have sharply increased\”. There are three clear indicators of the failure of the Russian policy, military and political, in Chechnya: the pro-Russian parties, the armed resistance and the Chechen people. The Russian policy is generating a possible escalation of violence and extremism between those three parties in a way that indicates that after a decade from of war, the human tragedy in Chechnya is far from over.
Source: Central Asian Caucasus analyst
