BACKGROUND: Aslan Maskhadov was born and raised in Kazakhstan in the middle of the fifties, just like most leaders of the Chechen Independence Movement, such as Jokhar Dudayev and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. These leaders have become in the Chechen collective mental recollection an expression of one of the greatest crimes of the twentieth century, the Stalinist deportation and exile. Maskhadov moved up in his military service after graduating from the Military Academy in 1972 in Georgia. He became a major in the Soviet forces and held a sensitive position in the Republic of Lithuania. In 1992, he resigned his post in the Soviet Army to join the Chechen Independence Movement and became Chechen Chief of Staff in 1994. In 1996, he led the operation of liberating the Chechen capital of Grozny from Russian forces, which resulted in a humiliating Russian withdrawal from the Chechen Republic. Upon signing a treaty to end the conflict with then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who indicated that the treaty ended a 400-year-old conflict between Russia and Chechnya, Maskhadov became President of the Chechen Republic and strove to build a modern nation-state that has a strategic relationship with Russia. Therefore, he tried to control Chechen movements calling for continuing the war with Russia and Chechen gangsters, who began their criminal activities in the Republic in the name of the resistance. When the Russo-Chechen conflict reemerged in 1999, Maskhadov kept calling for a peaceful resolution and called on Russia to negotiate with Chechens to resolve the conflict and end the war. But these calls fell on the deaf ears of extremists in the Russian Military institution and Russian government hawks, represented by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. The assassination of Maskhadov is connected with the nature of the Russian policy in Chechnya since fighting recommenced in 1999. A policy that was characterized by a media blackout that allows foreign media to cover the war only through Russian Army channels, a brutality that led to numerous human rights violations and ethnic cleansing, and filtration camps (the name given to concentration camps) so severe that some observers have compared the policy to genocide. In addition to that policy, Russia adopted a strategic policy of assassinating Chechen leaders, starting with Jokhar Dudayev, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and now Maskhadov, as well as other leading figures. This policy is based on the idea that eliminating these leaders will dissolve the resistance. But so far, it has proven itself wrong as it only led to a further escalation of the conflict. Russian forces have placed Maskhadov on its assassination list from the start, gave him descriptions similar to those of Osama Bin Laden, and refused to negotiate with him despite the fact that he was the best and most appropriate choice because of his moderation, the international recognition he enjoyed as Chechnya’s legitimate President, and most of all his influence on Chechen resistance movements as was proven by the adherence of all factions to his unilateral ceasefire declaration in the beginning of February. However, that ceasefire created a crisis for the Russian and the Pro-Russian government in Chechnya, who had maintained all the while that Maskhadov was “politically dead” and wielded no influence on resistance factions.
IMPLICATIONS: Maskhadov’s assassination is concomitant with the attempts to divide power in Chechnya. Ever since Putin’s Russia tried to impose impractical solutions by endorsing a constitution for Chechnya and placing the former Mufti, Ahmad Kadyrov (whose murder in May 2004 was in itself a product of this Russian policy) at the head of a pro-Russian government, and then bringing his Interior Minister, Alu Alkhanov, to succeed him, power in Chechnya was divided between the pro-Russian wing, Aslan Maskhadov’s moderate national wing, and the extremist Chechen resistance wing allied with the salafi-jihadist way, including Arab fighters in Chechnya. Maskhadov proved with his ceasefire declaration, beyond any doubt his power, control and influence. However, Russia gave no heed to his ideas regarding negotiations and peace in Chechnya that was Russia’s only way out of its crisis in Chechnya. Maskhadov’s demonstration of his influence drove Ramzan Kadyrov to pursue him because he was a real threat to the corruption and illicit formations headed by Kadyrov. Kadyrov the younger was creating a state within a sate and exercised more power than Alkhanov, with Russian support. With the extremist Chechen wing losing popularity following the Beslan tragedy and with it its salafi-jihadist ally that was also suffering from the lack of funding and the assassination of its leaders, Maskhadov’s death apparently will escalate tension in Chechnya. The moderate national movement will want to avenge the killing of its leader and symbol of Chechnya’s independence. Therefore, there are likely to be more attacks on Russian forces and the pro-Russian Chechen government. But they will need time to find another leader who will call for ending the crisis through negotiations. On the other hand, the extremist wing will get the chance to rearrange itself and direct more attacks at Russia. These attacks will not be necessarily restricted to Chechnya because Maskhadov played an important role in refusing any military operations outside Chechen soil. While there were already many attacks outside Chechnya, these will probably increase, especially now that these extremists are free from any obligations to Chechnya’s political leader. As for the pro-Russian government, its loss is twofold: it will now be a target for Chechen resistance attacks; and it will become even less popular and suffer more isolation. The frustration created by Maskhadov’s assassination, who was the only hope for peace in Chechnya according to many Chechens, is likely to lead many to join the ranks of resistance in greater numbers and persist in their refusal of any solutions emanating from the pro-Russian government. As a result, Russia’s attempts to “Chechenize” the conflict will not succeed, because isolating the pro-Russian government will make it appear a part of the Russian forces and not simply a Chechen power in agreement with Russia.
CONCLUSIONS: Russia has opened the door for more violence in Chechnya. It disregarded advice by academics, non-government organizations and international organizations and powers to negotiate with Maskhadov. While it may not be practical to say that “history repeats itself”, the nature of the prolonged Russo-Chechen conflict bears resemblance to many cases such as the imprisonment of the leader of the Qadiriya order in 1864, Kunta Hadji. Thousands of murids (students and followers) took to the streets in a peaceful march demanding his release. Hadji was a proponent of peace and putting an end to the war that had exhausted the peoples of the North Caucasus with the end of the Muridi war with the surrender of its leader, Imam Shamil. The Russian response to the march was to open fire that killed around 4,000 people, in what was to become known later as the Shali incident. Since that date, the Qadiriya order became the greatest enemy of Russian forces in Chechnya, and took on the reigns of struggle against Russia which had been restricted to the Naqshbandiya order.
Source: Central Asian Caucasus analyst
